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FAIR TRADE AND HORIZONTAL PRICE FIXING: THEIR
STATUS SINCE THE SECOND SCHWEGMANN CASE*
PRICE fixing systems are generally illegal per se under the federal anti-
trust laws,' and, until 1937, this prohibition included systems whereby manu-
facturers fixed resale prices. 2 In that year, however, Congress carved out an
exception for trademarked or brand name goods.3 On such commodities
manufacturers can, within limits, fix resale prices if permitted to do so by
state law.4 In turn, the statutes of forty-five states allow price fixing agree-
ments between manufacturer and retailer, and render them enforceable against
*Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 71 (1953); In rc Doubleday & Co., CCH TRAun REo.
REP. 1 11,515 (FTC 1953).
1. Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1946) ; Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1946). E.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co.
v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Socony-Vacunnm
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392
(1927).
Prior to the Fair Trade exception to be discussed in this Note, only patent and copy-
right holders were allowed to fix prices. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S.
476 (1926). In recent years the Supreme Court has resisted efforts of patent holders to
use this exception as a means of monopolizing an entire industry. United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) ; United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S.
287 (1948). The Court has also prevented a copyright holder from fixing retail prices
where it would tend to eliminate competition among retailers. United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). Similar attempts to limit Fair Trade price fixing have
not yet been attempted. See note 37 in ra.
2. Resale price maintenance systems establish minimum prices below which no dealer
can sell. They were held illegal under both the Sherman Act, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911.), and the Federal Trade Commission Act,
FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
3. This amendment was contained in the Miller-Tydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937),
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946). It has been estimated that 50% of all market goods are identi-
fiable b3 a trademark or brand name. Not all of the commodities are covered by Fair
Trade systems; estimates of the percentage of sales where prices are fixed by Fair Trade
agreements vary from 4% to 20%. COVER, PROBLEMS OF SMALL BusiNEss 163, 199
(TNEC Monograph 17, 1941.) (hereinafter cited as TNEC REPORT) ; H.R. REP. No. 1292,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1952).
4. The Miller-Tydings Act contained two limitations: the price-fixcd goods must
be "in free and open competition" with commodities of the same general class; and the
price-fixers may not be in a "horizontal" or competitive relationship, e.g., manufacturers
and other manufacturers, jobbers and other jobbers, retailers and other retailers. How-
ever, Government antitrust agencies have maintained that these statutory limitations are
extremely difficult to enforce. See notes 36-7 infra.
5. Fair Trade legislation exists today in all jurisdictions except Missouri, Texas,
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nonsigning retailers.0  This resale price maintenance system, operating under
the deceptive misnomer "Fair Trade"7 and defended as a necessary protection
for small retailers,8 results in higher prices to the consumer.0
Vermont, and the District of Columbia. For table of state Fair Trade acts, see 5 C.ALL-
MANN, UxFAiR CoMPrITION AND TRADE-MARxs 2250 (1950). However, the statutes of
Florida, Georgia, Michigan, and Tennessee have been rendered unenforceable by judicial
decision. See note 17 infra.
6. The nonsigner clause in each of the state acts provides that noncontracting re-
tailers can be enjoined if, knowingly, they sell Fair Trade goods below the fixed price.
Most of these state acts label as "unfair competition" any attempt of the nonsigning re-
tailer to sell for less than the fixed price. For example, the Louisiana Fair Trade Act
provides:
"'Vilfully and kmowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity at
less than the minimum price stipulated in any [Fair Trade] contract . . . whelher the
person so . . . selling is or is not a party to the contract, is unfair competition and is
actionable by any person damaged." 27 LA. ST.-T. ANN. tit. 51, § 394 (1951) (emphasis
added).
7. Fair Trade is hardly "fair" from the consumer's viewpoint because it fixes prices,
eliminates competition, and deprives the public of the benefits of new distribution tech-
niques. Nor is it "fair" to many nonsigning retailers, sucl as supermarkets, department
stores, mail order houses, and "cut-rate," low overhead stores who desire to lower prices
and specialize in quantity sales. Fair Trade forces them to sell at fixed, higher prices,
and to share the profits with other, less efficient retailers. See TNEC REroar 19.
8. Fair Trade tends to perpetuate small retail stores in the Fair Trade industries-
notably the drug and liquor industries-because it prevents small retailers from being
undersold by newer, more efficient retailing techniques. See MuND, GomnnmNT? AND
Busixss 448 (1950); GmcH-R, PRIn CONTROL UNDER FAIr TRADE LYTsLATio:N 270
(1939).
For a good summary of the arguments made by proponents of Fair Trade laws, see
H.R. REP. No. 1292, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 37-40, 44-7, 50-4, 59-61, (1952).
9. One survey concluded that prices increased an average of one-third on Fair Trade
items in cut-rate and chain stores after the California Fair Trade Law was enacted.
Grether, Expericnce in California vith Fair Trade Legislation Restricting Price Cut-
ting, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 640 (1936).
A more comprehensive survey led to the conclusion that:
"'Such figures as are available show almost universally that price-maintained items
sell for higher prices than nonmaintained goods: that prices of contractual articles rose
after the law was passed: that prices average higher in cities where maintenance is legal
than in comparable cities where it is not legal." TNEC Rror 194.
MuxD, op. cit. supra note 8, at 447, quotes a 1943 Fortune Magazine survey of com-
parative prices as follows:
"Congressmen and lesser residents of the District of Columbia can lather up with a
big tube of Barbasol bought for 29 cents; in fair-trade Maryland, the same tube would
cost 39 cents. The Congressmen can regenerate the blood cells with Lilly's Le.tron
Pulvules (84's) for 2.29, instead of the fair-trade price of $3.15. A bottle of Old Grand-
dad is $5.45 in Washington, $6.65 (before state tax) across the line. BC headache pow-
ders are a dime instead of 19 cents.
"A recent study of 117 branded drug items showed that thirty-five cost about a third
less in Washington than in Maryland, thirty-eight about a quarter less, and twenty-nine
about a seventh less. A comparison of free-trade Missouri and fair-trade Illinois turns
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Fair Trade laws have had a tumultuous history over the last three years.
In 1951 they suffered a major setback in the first Supreme Court Schwcg-
mann decision declaring the nonsigner provisions invalid as to commodities
in interstate commerce. 10 In the following year Congress, under pressure from
retailers' and manufacturers' groups," passed the McGuire Act.12 This Act
up much the same story. The St. Louis Star-Times figured out that fifty-four fair-trade
drug items cost an average of 16.2 percent more on the east bank of the Mississippi than
on the St. Louis side. Fortune Magazine, The Not-So-Fair-Trade Laws, 70 (Jan. 1949)."
For general background on Fair Trade laws, see ZoRN & FELDMAN, BusixEss UNDER
THE NEW PRicE LAWS (1937); Shulman, The Fair Trade Acts and the Late, of Re-
strictive Agreenents Affecting Chattels, 49 YALE L.J. 607 (1940) ; Fulda, Resale Price
Maintenance, 21. U. OF CHLi. L. REv. 175 (1954).
10. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). For dis-
cussion of this case, and the economics of fair trade, see Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 381
(1952).
11. See testimony by Fair Trade exponents before congressional committees, Hear-
ings before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 5767, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate and Forehmn
Commerce on H.R. 5767, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
The most vigorous advocate of Fair Trade legislation has been the National Asso-
ciation of Retail Druggists. For a description of its successful tactics, see FTC, RMpoai'
ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 142-66 (1945) (hereinafter cited as FTC REitT).
"The National Association of Retail Druggists prepared and distributed to the state
associations a Fair Trade Manual, pamphlets, and bulletins for use in promoting such
legislation....
"The national association also, through its Washington -representative, formed Con-
gressional contact committees throughout the country, appointing key men for each Con-
gressional district .... These key men were personal friends or acquaintances of National
and State legislators and Governors of States." Id. at 154.
Twenty-one states adopted the model Fair Trade Act drafted by the NARD. 1I. at
xxviii.
Consumer groups, on the other hand, have been slow to organize. During Congres-
sional debate before passage of the McGuire Act, Senator Douglas condemned the bill
as special interest legislation which would take money out of consumers' pockets:
"However, that money will be slowly taken away from the American people; and
since it will be taken away in only small quantities from any one person, the consumer
will not know about it, will nt protest, will not be articulate, and will not be or-
ganized....
"[I]t is an extremely hazardous thing politically for one to take the floor of the
Senate and oppose this bill. In a given state, only a few consumers will know the issues
involved, or will particularly care .... But the special interests supporting the bill will
be deeply concerned and will resent our action....
"So here is a very classic case of a diffused general interest coming into conflict with
a powerful and concentrated interest." 98 CONG. Rm. 8882-3 (1952) (emphasis added).
12. 66 STAT. 631, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Supp. 1952). The McGuire Bill was passed
overwhelmingly, 196 to 10 in the House, and 64 to 16 in the Senate. 98 CoNo. REc. 8891
(1952). It amends § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and reads as follows:
"Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, is hereby amended
to read as follows:
"Sec. 5. (a)....
"(2) Nothing contained in this Act or in any of the Antitrust Acts shall render un-
[Vol. 63
NOTES
specifically exempts price fixing under Fair Trade nonsigner provisions from
federal antitrust laws,"5 and declares that Fair Trade agreements do not un-
lawfully burden interstate commerce.' 4 Thus the McGuire Act, while per-
petuating the earlier Miller-Tydings prohibition against "horizontal" price
fixing,t" erases 'the effect of the first Schwegmann decision and restores
limited immunity to F-air Trade operations.16
lawful any contracts or agreements prescribing minimum or stipulated prices, or requir-
ing a vendec to enter into contracts or agreements prescribing ininimq.m or stipulated
prices, for the resale of a commodity which bears, or the label or container (f which
bears, the trade-mark, brand, or name of the producer or distributoi of such commodity
and which is in free and open competition with commodities of the same general class
produced or distributed by others, when contracts or agreements of that description are
lawful . . . in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia ...
"(3) Nothing contained in this Act or in any of the Antitrust Acts shall render un-
lawful the exercise or the enforcement of any right or right of action created by any
statute. which in substance provides that wilfully and knowingly advertising, offer-
ing for sale, or selling any commodity at less than the price or prices prescribed in such
contracts or agreements whether the person so advertising, offering for sale, or selling
is or is not a party to such a contract or agr,'ment, is unfair competition and is action-
able at the suit of any person damaged thereby.
"(4) Neither the making of contracts or agreements as described in paragraph (2)
of this subsection, nor the exercise or enforcement of ay right or right of action as
described in paragraph (3) of this sabsection shall constitute an unlawfiul burden or re-
straint upon, or interference tcith, commerce.
"(5) Nothing contained in paragraph (2) of this subsection shall make lawful con-
tracts or agreements providing for the establishment or maintenance of minimum or stipu-
lated resale prices on any commodity referred to in paragraph (2) of this subsection, be-
tween manufacturers, or between producers, or between wholesalers, or between brokers,
or between factors, or between retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in
competition with ealh other."
Important innovations made by the McGuire Act, in comparison with the earlier
Miller-Tydings Act, are italicized.
13. See statute § 5(a) (2) and (3), note 12 supra.
14. See statute § 5(a) (4), note 12 supra.
15. See statute § 5(a) (5), note 12 supra. Both the Miller-Tydings and the McGuire
Acts expressly forbid price fixing agreements between competitors on the same distribu-
tive level. And the sponsors of the act stated that it would permit only "vertical" price
fixing (agreements between persons on different levels, e.g., a manufacturer and a re-
tailer). H.R. Rvi,. No. 1437, 82d Cong., 2d Ses 3 (1952).
16. The C'nigressi'nal sponsors forthrightly declared that the bill's purpose was to
overrule the Supreme Court. See H.R. REP. No. 1437, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1952).
By way of contrast, the Canadian Parliament, on December 29, 1951, made resale price
maintenance agreements illegal. The bill was sponsored as an anti-inflationary measure.
The sponsor of the bill had commented: "I find it very difficult . . . to escape one con-
clusion, and that is that many of those engaged in the business of producing and dis-
tributing in this country have one great ambition in common, and that is a desire to
escape from or miiimize the possibilities of present and future competition." The Canadian
report of the Rouyal Commission on Prices had reported: "'Ve conclude that the advan-
tages to the punlic claimed for this practice are greatly outweighed by 'he disadvantages."
Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on II.R. 5767,
82d Cong., 2d Ses. 18-1) (1952) (emphasis added).
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'his legislative victory for Fair Trade (lid not long go unchallenged. Both
the McGuire Act and state Fair Trade statutes were attacked in the courts
on constitutional grounds,' 7 and new claims that Fair Trade practices resulted
in horizontal price fixing were advanced before administrative agencies.18
The recent case of Schwegmann Brothers Giant Supermarkets v. Eli Lilly
' Co."' raised the constitutional issues. Lilly, a drug manufacturer, sued
Schwegmann Brothers, retailers, to enjoin them from selling Fair Trade com-
modities below the retail prices fixed by Lilly.21' Schwegmann Brothers
countered by attacking the constitutionality of the Louisiana Fair Trade Act 21
as made operative by the McGuire Act. Three grounds were urged: that
the law is insufficiently related to the public welfare to come within the police
power of the state; that it imposes an unlawful burden on interstate com-
merce; and, primarily, that it is an unconstitutional delegation of price fixing
power to private persons."
2
Denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court 23 left intact the majority opinion
of the Fifth Circuit 24 upholding the district court's injunction against Schweg-
mann. "' The Fifth Circuit felt that the 1936 Supreme Court decision in Old
Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp..2 6 which held the
17. Schwegmann Bros. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
74 Sup. Ct. 71 (1953). Sunbeam Corp. v. MacMillan, CCH TRADE REG. REP. 67,451
(D. Md. 1953); Sunbeam Corp. v. Payless Drug Stores, CCH TRADE REG. REP'. 67,492
(C.D. Calif. 1953).
Two state courts have held acts invalid under their state constitutions. Liquor Store,
Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949) ; Shakespeare Co. v. Lipp-
man's Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952). The Georgia court
held that the legislature must re-enact new legislation after the McGuire Act in order to
overcome earlier constitutional objections. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd.,
209 Ga. 613, 75 S.E.2d 161 (1953), cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 39 (1953). The Tennessee
court has rendered Fair Trade unenforceable in that state until a clear-cut ruling on con-
stitutionality has been delivered by a federal court, preferably the Supreme Court. Cal-
vert Distillers Corp. v. RIObilio, CCH TRADE REG. RaP. 67,540 (Tenn. 1953).
1& In re Doubleday & Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11,515 (FTC 1953) ; In re East-
man Kodak Co., CCH TRADE RsG. RE. 11,527 (FTC 1953).
19. 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 71 (1953).
20. Schwegmann Brothers were sued for selling a bottle of Lilly's insulin for $2.08,
whereas Lilly's Fair Trade price was $2.83. Schwegmann Bros. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205
F.2d 788, 793 (5th Cir. 1953).
Schwegmatn neither sold merchandise below cost nor employed "loss leaders." The
uncontradicted evidence indicated that Schwegmann made a profit of from 10 to 15%
on Lilly's products, as compared with 35 to 40% available under Fair Trade prices. Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros., 109 F. Supp. 269, 270 (E.D. La. 1953).
21. 27 LA. STAT. A.Nx.. tit. 51, §§ 391-6 (1951). See note 6 supra for excerpt from the
critical nonsigners" provision.
22. Schwegnann Bros. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205 F.2d 788, 790-1 (5th Cir. 1953).
23. 74 Sup. Ct. 71 (1953).
24. Schwegmann Bros. v. Eli Lilly & Cu., 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1.953).
25. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros., 109 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. La. 1953).
o. , )9 U.S. 183 (1930).
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Illinois Fair Trade Act constitutional, was controlling.-? Both the district
court and the Fifth Circuit dissent questioned Old Dearborn and urged its
reconsideration. 23
Although Schwegmann's first two arguments are probably insubstantialY
the third contention poses serious questions. In the Old Dearborn case, the
Court, through 'Mr. justice Sutherland, touched but lightly on the charge of
unconstitutional delegation of price fixing authority. 'Mr. Justice Sutherland
held that the retailers had consented in advance to price fixing by accepting
goods already trademarked.3" But this "consent in advance" reply is unsatis-
factory. As the Supreme Court itself pointed out in the first Schwegmann
case, Fair Trade laws rest upon coercion rather than consent, for the enjoined
nonsigning retailer has clearly rejected the arrangement.31 Moreover, the
27. Schwegmann Bros. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205 F.2d 738, 792 (1953).
28. "In other words, it may well be found that the real purpose of fair trade legis-
lation is to protect the retailer from comptition with another retailer wh,_, because of
his efficient merchandising methods, is able to reduce his distributive costs and consequent-
ly his retail prices. This is a inatter, how,'ever, which addresses itself to the Supreire
Court." Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros., 109 F. Supp. 269, 272 (E.D. La. 1953)
(emphasis added). These views of the district judge were endorsed by Judge Holmes
in his dissent to the Fifth Circuit decision, 205 F.2d 788, 793-8 (1953).
29. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to invalidate economic legislation
as being beyond the state's police power. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); WVest
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) ; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502, 537-8 (1934).
The Supreme Court has been equally consistent in holding that congressional l2wer
over interstate commerce is plenary and that it may exercise that power Iy permitting
states to regulate designated phases of interstate commerce. Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) : International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S.
310,315 (1945).
30. Old Dearborn Distributing Corp. v. Seagam-Distillers Corp., 29 U.S. 183, 194
(1936). Only the trademark seemed to distinguish this delegation from the une outlawed
in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 23S (1936), where the Court had said: "[Iun
the very nature of things, one person may not be entrusted with the pmwer to regulate
the business of another, and especially of a competitor. And a statute which attepts
to confer such power undertakes an intolerable and unconstitutional interfcrence uith
personal liberty and private property." Id. at 311 (emphasis added).
Throughout the Old Dearborn decision the Court, through Mr. Justice Sutherland,
emphasized the good will involved in a trademark, statinig that the "primary aim of the
law is to protect the property-namely, the go, d will-f the producer, which he still
owns. The price restriction is adopted as an appropriate means to that perfectly legiti-
mate end, and not as an end in itself:' Old Dearborn Distributing Corp. v. Seagram-
Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 193 (1936). This classic statement is a questionable pre-
mise in light of the circumstances surrounding the passage of the legislation. Note, 49
YALE L.J. 145, 146 (1939). Furthermore, the primary purpose of a trademark is to pro-
tect the manufacturer's commodity from unscrupulous counterfeiting and copying by other
manufacturers. There seems to be little justification in allowing the trademark to become
a vehicle for price fi-ing. See Diggins, Trade-Marks and Restraints of Trade, 32 Go.
L.J. 113 (1944).
31. In speaking of Fair Trade laws, the Court said: "That is not price fixing by
contract or agreement: that is price fixing by ompulsiun." Schwegmann Bros. v. 2a1-
1954]
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"consent" argument fails to meet the basic constitutional challenge: that this
delegation of authority to private, interested parties-manufacturers--to fix
prices is unconstitutional. It is no answer to say that another group of private,
interested parties--retailers--has consented to the price fixing; a delegation
of its authority by a state, if unlawful, cannot be ratified and made lawful
by a private group.3 2
The Old Dearborn decision and the denial of certiorari in the second
Schwegmann case thus leave a vital question unresolved. Plenary power to
fix prices, when delegated to private groups, has a serious impact on the
consuming public.33 Since the Supreme Court has never squarely faced the
Fair Trade delegation question, its denial of certiorari in the second Schwcg-
mnann case constitutes an unfortunate exercise of judicial discretion . 4
With constitutional challenges temporarily quieted, 0 only one effective bar
to unrestrained Fair Trade activities remains: the McGuire Act proviso against
vert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 388 (1951). The Court further characterized enforce-
ment against nonsigners as "a program whereby recalcitrants are dragged in by the heels
and compelled to submit to price fixing." Id. at 390.
32. Thus the delegation involved here would seem clearly to be more objectionable
than that outlawed in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), and Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), where the legislation provided for
ratification by an agency or official of the Government. See Note, 50 HAitv. L. REv. 667
(1937).
33. When prices are determined by private parties rather than by public representa-
tives, there exists a strong tendency to charge all that the traffic will bear. See con-
curring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S.
287, 320 (1948). In this case, the Supreme Court outlawed a cross-licensing and license
rpooling arrangement which gave private parties the power to fix prices.
The impact of this price fixing power is made more serious by the lack of public
hearings or public supervision as to the reasonableness of the prices fixed. In Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941), the Court con-
demned "an extragovernmental agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and
restraint of interstate commerce."
The doctrine that price fixing is strictly a governmental function was originally
developed by Mr. Justice Peckham. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505
(1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
34. Of course, the court's denial of certiorari cannot be interpreted as a decision on
the merits, although jubilant Fair Traders were so inclined. See full page advertisement
by Doeskin Products, Inc., praising the "nine men of wisdom." N.Y. Times, Oct. 22,
1953, p. 44.
35. Despite the Old Dearborn decision, state Fair Trade Acts are not universally
considered constitutional. The highest courts of four states have invalidated state legis-
lation within the last three years. See note 17 supra. In addition, a lower New Jersey
court has recently declared the New Jersey Act unenforceable. Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-
Robinson Stores, Inc., 98 A.2d 623 (N.J. Super. 1953). Further constitutional challenges
have been made in other states. See CCH TRADE REG. REP. 111 67,366 (Ore. 1953), 67,379
(Ill. 1953), 67,381 (Md. 1953), 67,443 (N.Y. 1953), 67,462 (N.Y. 1953), 67,498 (Wash.
1953) ; Cal-Dak Co. v. Say-on Drugs, 254 P.2d 497 (Cal. 1953). The Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari will no doubt put the quietus on some of this litigation, but the con-
(Vol. 63
NOTES
horizontal price fixing.3 6 In the past. this limitation has been utilized infre-
quently; Government enforcement agencies maintain that the "cloak" of Fair
Trade laws makes the necessary proof of conspiracy doubly difficult? 7 But
with Fair Trade reinforced by the recent certiorari denial, new attention
should be devoted to the illegality of horizontal price fixing.
A recent development within the Federal Trade Commission indicates a
possible first step in this direction. In re Doubleday 38 involved a company
operating in the dual role of book manufacturer and retailer. Doubleday
signed Fair Trade agreements with competing retailers, thereby fixing retail
prices. The FTC saw the possibility of horizontal price fixing on the retail
level and filed a complaint.39 After taking initial evidence, the hearing examiner
dismissed the complaint. This action was reversed on appeal to the Com-
mission, which unanimously ordered the hearing to continue. Two commis-
sioners felt that the Doubleday arrangement was prima fade invalid.0 Two
others, however, thought more evidence was necessary for an ultimate deter-
mination of whether Doubleday the retailer, or Doubleday the manufacturer,
was fi-ing prices.41 But this decision, together with another announced two
weeks later involving almost identical facts,4 indicates that a manufacturer
who also retails may be barred from using Fair Trade agreements to fix retail
prices. While the Doubleday approach to such practices is a new one for the
stitutionality of Fair Trade will probably continue to be a doubtful and much contested
question.
36. See note 15 su pra. The only t'ther available statutory limitation, that the com-
modities must be in "free and upen competition with commodities of the same general
class produced or distributed by others:" was applied only once in fifteen years, under
similar language in the Miller-Tydings Act. Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F2d 592
(2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 828 (1947).
37. "If the Departmwnt of Justice had sufficient personnel to examine each contract
and the circumstances under which it was entered into, therc is no doubt that many re-
sale price maintenance agreements would be found to be zolathke of the antitrust lawu.
Lacking personnel sufficient to make the investigations necessary to develop cases show-
ing such violations, we can only appeal to the Congress to remove the cloa: behind which
the violators hide." Statement of H. G. Morison, Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't justice, Hearings before House Subcow:mittee on
Interstate and Foreign Connwerce on H.R. 5767, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 253, 259 (1952)
(emphasis added). The FTC also concluded that Fair Trade laws provide undesirable
protection for illegal price fixers. FTC REPORT Ix-L-d.
38. CCH TasE REG. REP. 1f 11,515 (FTC 1953).
39. Since Doubleday was a retailer, and fixed prices with other retailers, the agree-
ments were between competitors on the same distribution level. Ibid.
40. Commissioners Carretta and Spingarn took this view. Ibid.
41. Chairman Howrey and Commissioner Mead thus felt that the hearing e'aminer
did not reach "the ultimate question for decision." Ibid.
42. The factual situation of In re Eastman Kodak Co., CCH Tawa REt. REP. 11, 2
(FTC 1953), was similar. Eastman operated both as a manufacturer and retailer, and
fixed all retail prices by Fair Trade contracts. Commissioner Mason, who had not par-
ticipated in the Doubleday case, joined in the majority decision that the complaint stated
a cause of action. Chairman Howrey dissented, and Commissioner Mead did not partici-
pate.
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FTC,43 it is based on established precedent: the Supreme Court has in the
past prohibited manufacturers from joining into horizontal arrangements, on
either the wholesale or retail level. 4 4
The impact of the Doubleday interpretation may be significant; a consider-
able number of Fair Trade manufacturers also operate retail outlets.4" And
an even greater number act as wholesalers by selling direct to retailers, while
signing Fair Trade contracts with competing wholesalers, 40 thereby fixing
wholesale prices. Under Doubleday's rationale, these arrangements would also
be condemned as containing the prohibited horizontal price fixing element.
Nor are the potentialities of the McGuire Act proviso limited to situations
where the manufacturer plays a double role. Fair Trade practices which are
even more widespread also smack of horizontal price fixing conspiracy. First,
Fair Trade in operation encourages horizontal price fixing on the manufactur-
ing level: two manufacturers may not lawfully agree to fix prices, but they
can accomplish the same result indirectly by adopting identical "vertical" price
structures.4 7  Since Fair Trade sanctions vertical agreements, the temptation
43. The possibility of the Doubleday approach has been foreseen for some time But,
until the present, such arrangements were considered safe. See Williams, Resale Price
Maintenance and Minimum Price Legislation in INsTITUTE ON ANTITRUST LAWS AND
MINIMUNI PRICE LEGISLATION 141, 153 (1950); 1 CALLMANN, UNFAIR CoMPETITION
AND TRADE-MARKS 461 (1950).
44. United States v. Frankfort Distillers, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945) (manufacturers
joined with certain retailers to pressure other retailers into fair trade arrangements);
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944) (manufacturer co-
operated with both retailers and wholesalers to fix prices).
45. See PHILLIPS, MARKETING BY MANUFACTURERS 144 (1946); ZORN & FELDMAN,
BUSINESS UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAWS 12-13 (1937).
46. See PHIU.IPs, MARKETING BY MANUFACTURERS 145-57 (1946). According to the
United States Bureau of Census, 28% of total sales in 1948 were made by manufacturers
direct to retailers. 4 CENSUS OF BUSINESS 12 (1952). Of course, further analysis would
be required to determine the use of this distribution method for commodities which are
sold under Fair Trade price fixing agreements.
47. Such use of resale price maintenance is illustrated by figures for one in-
dustry's minimum resale prices in FTC REPORT 542:
MINIMUM RETAIL PtICE
ITEM Johnson & Baer & Parkc-
Absorbent Cotton: Johnson Black Davis
1 pound Carton $ 0.69 $ 0.69 $ 0.69
Y2 pound Carton .37 .37 .37
Y pound Carton .23 .23 .21
Adhesive Tape:
Y inch by 5 yds. .10 .10 .10
1 inch by 5 yds. .19 .19 .19
2 inches by 5 yds. .33 .33 .33
Gauze Bandage:
1 inch by 10 yds. .05 .05 .05
1Y2 inch by 10 yds. .08 .08 .08
2 inch by 10 yds. .10 .10 .10
3 inch by 10 yds. .14 .14 .14
4 inch by 10 yds. .19 .19 .19
Surgical Gauze, 36 inches by 10 yds. .49 .47 .49
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NOTES
to set identical prices would seem irresistible, especially where the manufac-
turers are few in number.4 8 In this manner, resale price maintenance can
become a tool for eliminating price competition between competing brands.
It is therefore not surprising that Fair Trade is used most effectively in in-
dustries dominated by only a handful of manufacturers.43 Where such agree-
ments between retailers and oligopoly manufacturers exist, the horizontal price
fixing proviso should be revitalized. When Fair Trade manufacturers con-
sistently fix identical resale prices, there is circumstantial evidence of con-
spiracy.5 ' If the doctrine of conscious parallel action is invoked, as it should
be, such practices could be struck down under both the Sherman and Federal
Trade Commission Acts.5a In this way, Fair Trade activities could be brought
within their legal limits, and at least limited competition among manufac-
turers could be restored for the consumer's benefit.
Fair Trade, moreover, facilitates horizontal price fixing among retailers.- ''
It encourages them to operate through powerful trade associations to coerce
48. "In the operation of resale price laws, there is a tendency for varius manufac-
turers-such as those of flour, cereals, soaps, canned milk, atid vegetable svrtenings-t,
make identical resale price agreements. This procedure serves tu eliminate price com-
petition at the manufacturing level, ior all manufacturers will thereupon sdl to the whtle-
salers or retailers at the same price." Mt'x,, op. cit. sutra nute 8, at 44o.
49. "Application of resale price maintenance, especially with respect to staple articles,
has been fostered in certain industries where production is largely concentrated in the
hands of a few manufacturers. ... FTC RF'oRT lvi.
50. "Acceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to par-
ticipate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of in-
terstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful c ,nspiracy under the Sherman
Act" Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939).
Without the implied conspiracy doctrine the antitrust laws are ineffective; but if p.-r-
mitted this essential weapon, they can more properly fulfill their basic functions of main-
taining competition and prohibiting market control by powerful special interests. FTC v.
Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 6S3 (194,3); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781 (1946); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 143 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
See Rostow, The INew Shcrmnan Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. OF Cur.
L. REv. 567, 574-5 (1947) ; Levi, The Antitrus.t Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. op Cur. L.
REv. 153, 18-3 (1947).
51. In finding a conspiracy under the Sherman Act, courts usually require additional
evidence besides the parallel business practices. American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781 (1946). Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, on the other hand, the
parallel prices in themselves might constitute an unfair method of competition and hence
a violation of § 5, without the necessity of additional incriminating evidence. This latter
theory was relied upon successfully by the FTC in Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC,
168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. . FTC,
336 U.S. 956 (1949). However, this development wN-as bitterly criticized by many and the
future usefulness of the conscious parallelism doctrine is still in doubt. See Kittelle &
Lamb, The Implied Conspiracy Doctrine and Delivered Pricing, 15 LAw & Co:;=zr p.
PRoB. 227 (1950).
52. "Thenceforward any group of distributors desiring to fix prices horizontally would
be foolish to take the direct road to that end. Instead, some one of their number should
make a vertical contract with a supplier and then place the other memburs of the group
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manufacturers into adding new commodities to the Fair Trade list and into
raising retail prices to a high level.5 3 In fact, Fair Trade is most effec-
tively practiced where strong retailers' groups exist. 4 Here again the McGuire
Act proviso should be given new force. When retailers band together to ex-
tract high Fair Trade prices from manufacturers, a price fixing conspiracy
can be foundya
In the foregoing situations, traditional doctrines of implied conspiracy can
be raised not only by agents of antitrust enforcement but also by nonsigning
retailers resisting Fair Trade. Where they can show rigid price parallelism
among manufacturers, or concerted coercion from retailers, nonsigners may
on notice of the existence of the contract. Through this means the group could not only
negate the objections of the Government but could actually use the courts as devices to
enforce the arrangement." Statement of Everette MacIntyre, Assistant Director, Bureau
of Antimonopoly, Federal Trade Commission in Hearings before Senate Conmnittee on
Interstate and Foreign Comnerce, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 28 (1952) (emphasis added).
53. "In practice, however, resale price maintenance serves as a focal point for dealer
cooperative effort to bring pressure to bear on manufacturers to place products under
price maintenance at prices yielding dealer margins satisfactory to cooperating organized
dealer groups." FTC REPoRT liv.
"Lack of adequate enforcement of the antitrust laws [caused by Fair Trade exemp-
tions] leaves a broad field for the activities of organized trade groups to tilize it for
their own advantage and to the detriment of consumers." Id. at lxi. See Fulda, Resale
Price Maintenance, 21 U. OF Ci. L. REv. 175, 192-3 (1954).
54. "Pertinent in this connection is the fact that so-called fair trading has been most
successful in those fields where strong trade associations exist. Trade associations ...
can spread the fair-trade net over both retailers and manufacturers." Statement of H. G.
Morison, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't
justice in Hearings before House Subconnittee on Interstate and Foregin Commerce on
H.R. 5767, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 256 (1952). "[Plressure from distributors creates a
strong resemblance to horizontal price fixing. The druggists, through their State and
National associations, decided that they needed a 50 percent mark-up on invoice prices.
This comes close to horizontal action, although it is taken through the medium of an
association. Moreover, such pressure exerted simultaneously on competing manufacturers
reinforces the tendency toward identical prices at the production level. Horizontal price
fixing may not exist in name, but it is closely approached in fact." TNEC Rapoar 196.
In this connection, the following observation by the district court judge in the second
Schwegmnann case is significant:
"The affidavits in evidence taken from retail druggists show that unless the fair trade
price on plaintiff's products is protected, the retail druggists will stop selling plaintiff's
products and favor products of plaintiff's competitors." Eli Lilly & Co. v. Shwegmann
Bros. Giant Super Markets, 109 F. Supp. 269, 272 (E.D. La. 1953). This conduct would
seem to indicate evidence of concerted action among retailers.
55. See 1 CALLMANN, UNFAR COMPL.TION AND TR"E-MARxs 509, n.62 (1950).
Heretofore no serious efforts have been made by the Government to discourage organized
combinations among Fair Trade retailers, because of an alleged lack of personnel and
funds. See notes 37, 53 supra. However, the Supreme Court has approved governmental
limits on the activities of trade associations in other contexts. See, e.g., Sugar Institute,
Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936) ; United States v. American Linseed Oil Co.,




have a defense to Fair Trade injunction suitsYr6 Several decisions have denied
a Fair Trade plaintiff an injunction against a nonsigner on the ground that
plaintiff's resale price maintenance system, operating behind a veil of legality,
in fact constituted horizontal price fixing .57
Thus, repeatedly disregarded by the legislatures and now unheeded by the
Court, the voiceless consumer finds himself still saddled with Fair Trade's
higher non-competitive prices. But the constitutional challenges, left unre-
solved, may be brought again to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile the McGuire
Act provides a leaky umbrella for price fixers: new efforts to revitalize the
Act's proviso would discourage the extensive horizontal price fix-ing practices
now flourishing in the shelter of Fair Trade Laws.
56. See 1 CALLIMAxN, UNFAIR Co.'PErrrION AND Tn.PE-MAIus 497 (1950); Ljck-
hart, Violation of the Antitrust Lates as a Defense in Ciqil A tions, 31 M:.. L RU.
507, 563-8 (1947).
The other, more standard defense available to nonsigners invokes the equitable "clean
hands" doctrine. In order to obtain an injunction, the manufacturer must be diligent in
his enforcement program, and shuw no favoritism or discrimination. Fogel v. Bolet, 194
Misc. 643, 87 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. 1949) ; Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor
Store, Inc., 166 Misc. 342, 2 N.Y.S.2d 320 (Sup. Ct. 1938). Thus if the nonsigner can
show widespread undercutting of the fixed price, he has established his defense. Magazine
Repeating Razor Co. v. Weissbard, 125 N.J. Eq. 593, 7 A2d 411 (Ch. 1939). This de-
fense was attempted, unsuccessfully however, in General Electric Co. v. R. H. Macy &
Co., 199 Misc. 87, 103 N.Y.S2d 440 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
57. Schill v. Remington-Putnam Book C&., 182 Md. 153, 31 A.2d 467 (1943) (Fair
Trade agreements fi-ing retail prices of books held illegal and unenforceable) ; Pazen v.
Silver Rod Stores, Inc., 130 '.J. Eq. 407, 22 A.2d 237 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941) (Fair
Trade agreement fixing retail price of cigarettes held a "hurizontal contract" and thus
void; injunction dismissed by unanimous court) ; Rayess Y. Lane Drug Co., 133 Ohio St.
401, 35 N.E.2d 447 (1941) (Fair Trade agreements fixing retail prices of cigarettes found
to be a "horizontal" arrangement, and hence unenforceable against a nonsigner).
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